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The Italian university system is in a profound and dangerous crisis.  The below par 
performance of Italian universities is compared with  the increasingly successful  
accomplishments of Canadian Universities. The paper identifies the major source of this 
performance differential in the hiring and promotion procedures. Funding methods also 
facilitate the success of Canadian Universities. The paper recommends a radical reform of 
the Italian system  and  a move towards a more decentralized, independent, flexible and 
transparent system like that of Canada. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the gloomy state and decaying performance of the Italian university system 
(IUS, henceforth) vis-a-vis the much more successful Canadian one (CUS, henceforth). The paper 
identifies the major source of the “Italian academic disease” in the hiring process and its related 
institutions. Disease which reflects the ethos and substance of the crisis of “System Italy”. Whilst in  
Canada the  University  hiring processes and career incentives are akin to the US ones, Italy is still 
anchored to an archaic, inefficient and harmful set of arrangements.  
This paper proposes three basic reforms which would favour a pragmatic meritocracy (as opposed 
to a spurious meritocracy superimposed from the top), would increase flexibility and so help to 
reverse the current downward trend of the Italian University performance. The work  suggests that 
the major opposition to such reforms would come from inside an academic body used to the 
advantages and privileges of an insular and self-referential system.  This  academic body has often 
been supported by a closed alliance and cultural affinity with a political class also adept at reaping 
the advantages of easy rents. 
 
2.  Performances of the Canadian and Italian University systems. 
 
Once in a while  the columns of Italian newspapers are  filled by articles debating the decline 
of Italian Universities and the current Italian Government is trying to introduce a radical reform to 
reverse this tide through the so-called “Riforma Gelmini” (Gelmini’s Reform). This paper tries to 
assess the extent of the Italian University crisis and see if the current proposed reform represents a 
breakthrough for a brighter future.  The analysis is carried out through a comparative assessment 
between the performance and organization of the Canadian and Italian University systems. The 
comparison does not aim to be detailed but will touch only those items of the two systems which 
would be relevant to explain the performance differential. 
The choice of Canada as a benchmark for this paper’s evaluation is twofold. The Canadian 
framework reflects a successful model and Canada and Italy are not too far apart in terms of 
economic size and institutional arrangements. The organization of Canada’s Universities has been 
moulded by the U.S. experience which has been hugely successful vis-a-vis the European one over 
the last 60 years.  The US could have offered a natural yardstick for such a comparison. However 
the conspicuous economic, social and political differences between Italy and the US would have 
cast a doubt about the relevance of the exercise. Instead the size of the Canadian and Italian 
Economies are not too different  and the forms of government in the two countries are reasonably 
similar.  
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “World Factbook” the 2008 estimated  
GDP’s per Capita (2008 US$ on a purchasing power parity basis) for Canada and Italy amount to 
$39,300 and $31,000   respectively, the GDP composition by sector is also quite close ( Canada: 
agriculture: 2%, industry: 28.4%, services: 69.6%; Italy: agriculture: 2%, industry: 26.7%, services: 
71.3%) and both countries are small open economies.  Though with inevitable differences (e.g. the 
electoral mechanisms, the Canadian Federal structure) both  countries are characterized by a 
Parliamentary Government and committed to  extensive public welfare policies through direct 
public intervention. The major differences between Canada and Italy are in terms of territorial size, 






raw materials endowment. None of these factors seem to be sufficiently relevant to affect the  
analysis below. 
Notwithstanding the economic and institutional similarities, Canada and Italy have 
University systems with structurally profound differences which are mirrored in their respective 
scientific, training and organizational performances.  
The performance of the two countries can be easily evaluated by looking at the 2008 and 
2009 World university rankings of “The Times of Higher Education Supplement” (THES). Tables 1-3 
in the Appendix  summarize the results of the THES rankings. It can be immediately noticed that no 
Italian University has ever entered in the top 150 universities. In the 2008 and 2009 rankings only 
one Italian university, Bologna, ranked 192
nd in 2008 and 174
th 2 in 2009, is present. In the 2007 
THES rankings there were two: the University of Bologna ranked 173
rd and the University of Rome 
ranked 183
rd. Thus between 2007 and 2008 the University of Rome exited the rankings while 
Bologna’s rank position deteriorated and dropped twenty places and then came back to 172
nd in 
2009.  
While Italy hangs on close to the bottom of the THES rankings in all three years(23
rd in 2007,  
29
th in both 2008 and 2009), Canada is fourth in 2007, third in 2008 and fourth in 2009.  In all three 
years Canada has eleven Universities in the top 200.  What is more remarkable is that three 
Canadian universities are constantly in the top fifty universities in all the three years. In the top 100 
and 150 universities Canada could count six and ten respectively in 2007, five and eight in 2008 and 
four and nine in 2009.    The lowest ranked Canadian University in 2007 (Calgary, 166) is ranked 
higher than the highest ranked Italian one.  In 2008 only one Canadian university (Dalhousie) 
University is ranked lower than Bologna, while in 2009 is only Simon Fraser which lags behind 
Bologna. 
The methodology used by the THES to draw these rankings is based on six measures: the 
peer review score, the employer review score, the staff/student score, the citations/staff score, the 
international staff score and the international students score. Bologna University’s scores are quite 
good for the first two indicators, but are very poor for the other four. Among these indicators, the 
“citations/staff” score (css henceforth) is  the measure more closely related to research 
performance. In 2007 only two universities, both from the U.S., obtain a maximum css of one 
hundred,  while the University of Toronto is ranked 14
th with a score of ninety-three. The 
Universities of Bologna and Rome score sixty-two (170
th) and seventy-one (131
st) respectively. The 
subsequent year ten Universities could score one hundred. Of these universities nine are from the 
US while the tenth is Canadian (University of Toronto). The University of Bologna has a score of 
forty and is ranked 173
rd in this category. In 2009 again the leading universities are ten and again 
nine of these are from the US and one from Canada (Calgary).  Bologna’s score of 34 is lower than 
the score of the lowest ranked Canadian (Simon Fraser, 53). From tables 4-5 is also possible to see 
that Canada has consistently 2-3 universities in the top fifty and 8-10 in the top one hundred and 
fifty. Thus there are clear signs of research excellence for Canadian universities. 
From the THES outcomes it clearly emerges that the CUS is performing quite well and with 
clear indications of improvement in an international perspective. Instead the IUS is performing 
badly. In addition there are  alarming signals  of possible further decline with a high risk o f not 
having any institution in the top 200 in the near future. 
These disturbing warnings for the IUS are further confirmed by the Field rankings for Italy 
and Canada published by the THES (2009c, 2009d). Italy ( Table 7) has only nine fields out of 






world averages we have a total of -38% or a -1.81% per field on average. All the twenty fields 
considered for Canada (Table 8) are above the world average with a total positive score of +333% or 
+16.65% per field on average.  
The difference in performance is dramatic but perhaps not surprising. If we look at the fields 
rankings of Scotland and Sweden (THES 2009a, THES 2009 b), both two small open economies with 
a U niversity structure closer to that of Canada than to that of Italy,  we can see that both 
outperform Italy and that Sweden even outdoes Canada. The above observed indicators are 
showing not only the poor performance of the Italian system relative to the Canadian one but also 
point out its ongoing crisis on the international scene.  
 
3.  Why are they doing so well while we are doing so badly 
 
A  natural question emerging from the evidence shown in the previous section is: why is Italy 
doing so badly while Canada is doing so well?  The answer can be found in Bok (2003, p.106): 
 
“Research universities are rarely, if ever, any better than their faculties. If they are to make 
their greatest contribution, therefore, it is imperative that they guard the integrity of their 
procedures for appointing and promoting professors. Those who are entrusted with such decisions 
should make them solely on the basis of the quality of the candidate’s teaching, research,  or other 
contributions to the academic purposes of the institution....If universities do not honor this principle, 
the quality of their academic work will surely suffer and they will find it harder to recruit scientists 
and scholars of genuine distinction.” 
 
Italy has violated this basic tenet for too long and now is paying a bitter price. It is possible 
to address many factors which are damaging the proper functioning of Italian Universities, however 
most of these could be easily removed if appropriate practices for recruiting and promotion were 
introduced. The cause o f the predicament of Italian Universities lies in the institutions and 
procedures adopted  for appointing and promoting professors. Two institutions and the procedures 
associated with them are responsible for the deficient hiring and promoting mechanisms which have 
afflicted the Italian University system and impaired its performance. The two institutions are the so-
called “valore legale del titolo di studio” and “concorso pubblico”.  
Before addressing in more detail the issues concerned with these two institutions let us first 
point out that the organization of the IUS (reflecting that of the Italian society) is highly 
bureaucratic and has a pyramidal structure  with the ministry of the university and the professorial 
guild at the top. Like many other professions in Italy the academic profession is organized like a 
guild which co-opts  its associates rather than hire them through a free market process. At the top 
of the guild stands a restricted group of professors (once upon a time called “the barons” and 
nowadays rebranded with the more flattering but less precise label of “ caposcuola”, i.e. the “head 
of a school of thinking”) which runs most of its activity. Each baron has nurtured his/her protégées ( 
and faction), advancing the obedient ones, independently of their quality, and holding back and 
possibly driving out the independents even when of high quality. This has been possible because of 
the two abovementioned institutions and their careful manipulation by the interested parties.   
To the best of my knowledge there is no proper translation into English of the first 







translation, “legal value of academic qualification”, and its acronym, LVAQ. The Italian legal system 
confers legal recognition of academic qualifications (and so of degrees) and grants special legal 
protections to such qualifications. In operational terms the possession of a recognized qualification 
is a necessary condition to enter any competition to join public services or specific professions. In 
the specific perspective of this paper an Italian degree becomes a prerequisite in order to apply for 
an academic position. Let’s provide an example of the perverse way in which the LVAQ can operate. 
Suppose an Italian graduate in physics decides to continue his/her studies abroad where he/she 
obtains an M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Economics. Suppose this person decides to come home and apply for a 
University job  or government position (Italian Universities are state institutions and its professors 
are civil servants). If the job competition is open only to people owning an Italian degree in 
Economics and Commerce, Political Sciences and Statistics then such a person cannot apply for a job. 
If he/she applies anyway, the application is rejected as invalid. Furthermore,  once a candidate has 
an appropriate Italian degree, all Italians degree have the same value once a candidate enters a 
competition. In the above example a degree from the best Italian Economics Faculty (in Italy degrees 
are managed by Faculties) and the worst one have the same value as far the competition is 
concerned. It is clear how this tool can preclude “undesired” applicants if adeptly manipulated and 
simultaneously pauperize the candidates pool. This institution was introduced in the 1930’s and 
reflects the “dirigisme” and guild structure of Fascist Italy. It has found large opposition in the liberal 
side of the country since the birth of the new Italian republic after the second world war (Einaudi, 
1947, 1955; Sartori, 2008; Manzini, 2008). Notwithstanding this authoritative opposition, no Italian 
government has ever even attempted to remove this archaic and outdated institution. Why ? 
Neglect? Lack of interest for one important aspect of the educational system and the organization of 
public employment? Hardly, given also the loud noise of the critics. Thus it is and has been a 
deliberate choice based on a specific set of values and view of society.  
The subsequent question to be asked is: which specific view of society and set of values are 
so important to support such a damaging institution?   A detailed answer to this question would go 
beyond the scope and space allowed to this work. However it is reasonable to suspect the presence 
of political interests which do not coincide with the interest of the country and its citizens. Political 
interests which have their roots in the complex links between political parties and the professorial 
guild ( more precisely: part of it). 
The complementary tool to the LVAQ is “il concorso pubblico” (the Italian public 
competition, IPC henceforth). The IPC is the other necessary instrument for hiring and promoting 
academics.  As pointed out by Ichino (2006) the IPC is a  poor hiring tool.  The IPC is a highly 
centralized machine strictly under the control of the Ministry of Education, University and Research 
(MIUR) and of the “professorial guild”. To be initially hired at any level a person must satisfy LVAQ 
and be selected via the IPC. To be promoted an academic, even if he/she already belongs to a 
specific faculty and university, must go through the IPC as he/she was hired for the first time. There 
is no real distinction in Italy between the process of hiring and that of promoting.  This lack of 
separation  between the two processes often obstructs attempts at renewing and  improving  
faculties. The timing of IPC is dictated by the Ministry which is subject to the vagaries and shocks of 
Italian political activity and so is the IPC. Thus the IPC is held irregularly through time and not in 
response to the needs of the Faculty or Departments but to the whims of political life. Such irregular 
schedule would bring about congestion or shortage of candidates and favour the allocative (or re-
allocative) strategies of the professorial guild. However this is not the basic drawback of IPC, it is just 






Ministry and the “powerful academics”), which might have a stronger interest in preserving their 
power than promoting academic excellence, are calling the shots.  
The IPC has undergone several mutations of its format but it has always retained the 
fundamental characteristic of being under a strict centralized control. For the sake of simplicity we 
can encapsulate IPC formats in three categories: 
 
1)  the purely centralized; 
2)  the falsely decentralized; 
3)  the new centralization 
 
The “purely centralized” has been the format (with small variations through time ) used up 
to the 1990’s . The Ministry would call a competition for a specific number of positions. The number 
of positions would vary between “settore disciplinari” (“branches of learning”, BoL henceforth). The 
BoL classification system is a strictly regulated, narrowly defined subdivision of fields of knowledge. 
It does not just separate between large groups ( Physics, Chemistry, Economics,...) or narrower 
subgroups ( e.g.  Theoretical Physics, Applied Physics,...Macroeconomics, Microeconomics), but 
imposes a very narrow subdivisions within subjects, e.g. for Economics there are 19 BoL’s such as 
Political Economy, Economic Policy, Public Finance, Applied Economics, History of Economic 
Thought, Statistics, Economic Statistics, Econometrics, Social Statistics, .........  The goal of such 
subdivision is not necessarily to guarantee the expertise of the hiring committee and clearly define 
the areas of competence of candidates. Its aim is to demarcate the boundaries of  the influence of 
“potentates” and facilitate control over the processes of hiring and promoting. The whole Italian 
academic body would vote to elect the members of the hiring committees. To be elected to a 
committee an academic should belong to a specific BoL. Furthermore he should have a rank at least 
as high as the rank f or which the competition is  advertised. However in each committee, 
independently for which rank, full professors have to be the majority, e.g. for an associate professor 
position and a panel of five people there will be three full professors and two associate professors. It 
is clear that by expertly controlling the voting process a small group of professors (the above 
mentioned “barons”) could control the academic body of the whole country. Negotiations behind 
closed doors could be carried out to ensure the election of “acceptable”  committees. Not many 
surprises emerged with such a mechanism in place: the expected people often (or almost always) 
landed the expected jobs. The system was strictly centralized, devoid of competition (also thanks to 
language insularity) and despotically run. A person could not get hired or be promoted without the 
agreement of the guild (i.e. of the barons). In such a centralized system the IPC decided who was in 
the academic profession and who was out. If somebody failed tenure, he/she could not try to 
continue his/her career in another Italian university as that failure would hold for the whole 
academic body. The worse shortcoming of this centralized procedure was that it introduced a large 
distance between the decision makers and the outcome of their choice. At the same time it 
conferred large powers of control over the whole profession to a limited number of people. The 
separation between decision and consequence the decision itself, together with funding schemes 
unrelated to academic performance, provided a shield of false objectivity and  freed hiring 
committees of responsibility. 
In the 1990’s, under the pressure of globalization, Italian governments gave way to a series 
of reforms in the Higher Education System while at the same time  managing to aptly distort them so 






decentralization” was introduced in that period. Funding of positions was decentralized to 
Universities which would decide how many new jobs they could afford. Universities would also 
choose at what level and for which faculties they will have available vacancies. The non-separation 
between hiring and promotion continued unabated.  Four out of five (4/5 rule) committee members 
are chosen by ballot from the national pools defined by the branches of learning. The fifth member 
of t he panel had to be selected by  the Faculty with a vacancy availability. This modus operandi, 
though imperfect, was getting closer to the d ecentralized hiring system of North American 
Universities. The 4/5  rule  ( together with existing funding regulations ) still distanced the hiring 
committee from the consequences of its choice, favoured internal candidates and facilitated inside 
dealings among the members of hiring committees. Though flawed this procedure  was a step 
forward.  A further improvement would have been the abandonment of the 4/5 rule in favour of a 
committee fully chosen inside the Faculty/Department and a system of University funding related to 
performance. This step was never taken. On the contrary the new “Gelmini’s reform” is a step back 
towards the old centralized system. This new reorganization enforces the return to the centralized 
hiring committees. The major difference with the past is that the members of the committees are 
randomly selected via a lottery system. Allegedly this system would reduce the risk of inside 
negotiations. In reality it does not. It does not embody any  incentive for committee’s members to 
avoid  negotiations and dealings. Since the pool for the random selection is largely formed by people 
of  the “old order”, it is very likely that this order would manage to replicate itself.  The reform is 
succeeding in distancing again the decision makers from the consequences of his/her choices. This 
effect is enhanced by a funding system feigning  meritocratic values. The system would impose 
rankings among institution based on the decisions of the Ministry itself and local departmental 
lobbies. This meritocracy imposed from the top can easily be adjusted according to the necessities of 
the powerful pressure groups.  The “Gelmini’s reform” is autocratic at its core and  aims at 
reinforcing the power of the Ministry and of the faithful professorial guild ( the winning side of it). It 
does not aim at true reform but at maintaining a status quo behind a veil of changes. The current 
Gelmini’s reform reminds  of the  (authentic or apocryphal) aphorism of the Roman Consul Caius 
Petronius: 
 
 “ I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing: and a 
wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion, 
inefficiency and demoralisation”. 
 
Why is Canada so successful? The reason is simple. In Canada there is no institution similar 
to the LVAQ or the IPC. Canadian Universities, like the  US ones, are very decentralized. Hiring 
decisions are taken by individual departments in a collegiate way. The approach varies from 
university to university. For the sake of simplicity we may summarize it as follows. The University 
publicizes vacancies in some fields. Potential candidates send applications which are selected by a 
hiring committee of the relevant department. The selected candidates are invited for an interview 
and to present a piece of their research work.  The hiring committee submits its decisions to the vote 
of the department itself. The department, in principle and in practice, could reject the hiring 
committee recommendations and change the choices. The names of the selected candidates are 
submitted to the approval of the university senate (or equivalent institution). If the senate approves,  
the applicants are hired. Promotions are done internally in departments and do not require any sort 






departmental decision (approval or rejection of the application) should be ratified by the university 
senate (or equivalent institution).  After six years candidates hired at the lowest rank (assistant 
professor) will submit their work over the past six years for tenure and promotion to the rank of 
associate professor. Failure to obtain tenure in one university does not preclude the candidate from 
obtaining it at another university. There are several examples of young scholars failing tenure at 
their original university and then fulfilling their high potential elsewhere (sometimes returning with 
flying colours from where they started). The system is flexible, open, transparent and aimed at the 
minimum wastage of resources. Each department and university (and each individual within it) 
should take full  responsibility  for    their choice. Responsibility which may be reflected in less 
resources, less power and a loss of reputation should wrong choices be often repeated. On the other 
end successful decision making would lead to high rewards in similar dimensions. 
Canadian universities are financed by The Federal Government, Provincial Governments, the 
Canadian private sector and international  funds( CAUT Almanac 2009-2010). The funding is largely 
related based on the number of students without appealing to official government rankings like the 
UK Research Assessment Exercise (which instead has liked by Italian reformers for its intrinsic 
centralization of power). Research funding in Canada comes mostly from Federal Government 
agencies (such as CIHR, NSERC, SSHRC, the Canada Foundation for Innovation) and different 
provincial agencies. Most research funding goes to individuals and not to institutions. Therefore 
Universities have a strong incentive to secure the services of the most productive (or potentially 
productive) researchers.   
Research related teaching programmes receive funding according to their success. For 
instance a University could start a Ph.D. programme without government support. If the programme 
is successful the government would then largely fund the programme ( the funding for a graduate 
student is approximately four times as big as that of an undergraduate).  
There are t herefore compelling reasons for individual academics, departments and 
Universities to succeed on the international scene. At the same time there not institutions which 
would favour  (even implicitly) a national professorial guild and its dependence on the political 
system. Each province is keen to have successful research universities as they would generate 
positive externalities and attract investment. Thus they compete with each other in supporting their 
universities. The Canadian Government has compelling similar motivations to keep its educational 
system competitive on the international scene. Through time this successful regime has also brought 
about generations of highly qualified civil servants, politicians and private officers who can 
understand and  appreciate high academic standards. A foreign visitor to Canada who has the 
opportunity to meet civil servants, company managers or politicians will often notice that they have 
Ph.D.’s or postgraduate degrees.  
The intrinsic openness of the CUS favours interaction with foreign academics, facilitates the 
exchange of ideas (and where possible of resources) and fosters scientific and cultural advancement. 
The CUS is doing very well because is rooted in an approach which is the opposite of the Italian one: 
an approach which is decentralized, independent, open, flexible and transparent.  
 
4.  What Lesson from Canada 
 
What can Italy learn from Canada? As Italy is economically and institutionally not too far 







First, the  IUS should try to bring decision makers (members of hiring committees, faculties 
and departments) close to the responsibility for their choices. Decentralization would be the first 
fundamental step. Who chooses  (and promotes) whom should be clear and transparent. This way  
the success or failure of their decisions would also be clear and transparent. The system should be 
open and   devoid of  tools of ex-ante exclusion such as  the LVQA. It should be  flexible and 
uncomplicated and free of overwhelmingly bureaucratic procedures  which lend themselves to 
arbitrary exploitation. The IPC application forms are complex, convoluted, obscure  documents. 
Candidates can easily make mistakes and be rejected, even if highly qualified, because of formal 
mistakes. Such cumbersome application procedures should be eliminated and substituted by simple 
application packages ( a cv and a sample of publications chosen by the applicant). 
 
In summary Italy should: 
 
1) remove the LVAQ  
2) abolish the BoL 
3) separate the hiring and promotion processes 
4) decentralize 3) possibly by getting rid of the IPC ( c.f. Panunzi, 2009, for a similar view)  
5) link central government funding to performance and create incentives for local government and 
private funding. 
 
The implementation of these measures would weaken central government control and trigger the 
end of the powerbase of the “professorial guild”. However these measures, to be fully successful,  
should be introduced all together and without compromise. Their introduction  would create a 
system akin to the CUS. Carrying out 5) could be particularly difficult and dangerous. There are too 
many historical links between Italian government funding agencies and the current Italian academic 
body to believe that funding would be independent, fair and virtuous in the short run. At least for a 
decade it would be necessary to entrust the evaluation of Italian research and educational 
performances to boards of assessors drawn from different Universities among the most successful in 
North America. While hiring and promoting decisions will be decentralized to Italian universities and 
departments, central government funding should be assigned to external evaluators for whom a 
reputational game matters. This way the risk that the watchdogs are the dog themselves would be 
avoided. At provincial level a similar procedure could be followed. However local government 
funding of Universities tends to be very low in Italy and should be promoted. For instance assigning 
more tax power to local authority could be starting point to encourage regional funding. Similarly 
companies and private agents should be provided with incentives, such as  tax deductions or similar 
instruments, to support research and education.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
   The IUS is in a profound and dangerous crisis. Its crisis resembles that of its country.  It 
suffers   from  an excess of  formality which is aimed  at hiding, and not at preventing, predatory 
behaviour.  
From the THES tables we learn that the top universities  are in the English-speaking world. In this 
paper we have seen that, among the English speaking countries, the University system of Canada, a 
country  akin to Italy in few crucial dimensions, outperforms  the IUS.  The CUS, though heavily 






in advancing  knowledge, developing innovation, producing high quality graduates has made  Canada 
economically, socially and politically richer. The CUS itself has also become richer not only thanks to 
Government funding but also  through research grants, spin-off companies and alumni donations. 
  To get out of its quandary the IUS  needs radical reforms which could be designed alongside 
the CUS.  The LVAQ  should be urgently removed. The IPC should be reformed or, better, removed 
by assigning more direct responsibilities to Universities and Departments in their choice of 
personnel. Failing to do so, by introducing false reforms and a meritocracy of facade like the current 
“Gelmini’s reform” has done, would only endanger the potential recovery of the IUS. Similar tactics 
would confuse the public, distort the debate about important issues and favour the status quo.  
The international academic world is changing quickly and dramatically. Italy is at risk of being left 
behind. Any attempt to reform radically the system from within will be exceedingly difficult because 
the bureaucracy and its allies will be reluctant to surrender their power.  Ultimately they would have 
to capitulate to the forces of an increasingly open and globalized academic world. It is difficult to 
evaluate how much damage could still be inflicted to the IUS through this potential conflict. Probably 
the shorter the transition period the lower would be the costs. Whatever the costs, the above 
mentioned radical changes are unavoidable if the IUS wishes to be competitive at international level. 
The Friends of the status quo will “spray ink to stem this avalanche and build dams of paper against 
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Table 1: Number of universities in the Top 200 divided by country and ranking position -(Overall score) 2007 
Nation  1- 50  51-100  101-150  151-200  Tot. 
1.  Usa  20  17  12  8  57 
2.  UK  8  11  8  5  32 
3.  Australia  5  2     4  11 
4.  Canada  3  3  4  1  11 
5.  Japan  3  1  3  4  11 
6.  Netherlands  1  3  3  4  11 
7.  Germany     3  4  4  11 
8.  China  2  1  1  2  6 
9.  France  2     1  2  5 
10.  Switzerland  1     4    5 
11.  Belgium     1  2  2  5 
12.  Hong Kong  2  1  1     4 
13.  Sweden    1  1  2  4 
14.  New Zealand  1     1  1  3 
15.  Denmark     1  2     3 
16.  Singapore  1  1        2 
17.  South Korea     1  1     2 
18.  Finland     1     1  2 
19.  Ireland     1     1  2 
20.  Austria        1  1  2 
21.  Israel        1  1  2 
22.  Brazil           2  2 
23. Italy           2  2 
24.  Taiwan        1     1 
25.  Mexico           1  1 
26.  Norway           1  1 
27.  South Africa           1  1 






Table 2: Number of universities in the Top 200 divided by country and ranking position -(Overall score) 2008 
Nation  I - 50  51-100  101-150  151-200  Tot. 
1.  Usa  20  17  12  9  58 
2.  UK  8  9  5  7  29 
3.  Canada  3  2  3  4  12 
4.  Netherlands     4  5  2  11 
5.  Germany     3  3  5  11 
6.  Japan  3  1  2  4  10 
7.  Australia  6  1  1  1  9 
8.  Switzerland  2  1  2  2  7 
9.  China     2  4     6 
10.  Belgium     1  2  2  5 
11.  Sweden     2     2  4 
12.  Hong Kong  3     1     4 
13.  Israel     1  2     3 
14.  France  2     2     4 
15.  South Korea      2     1  3 
16.  Denmark     1  1  1  3 
17.  New Zealand     1  1  1  3 
18.  Singapore  1  1        2 
19.  India           2  2 
20.  Ireland  1     1     2 
21.  Finland     1        1 
22.  Greece           1  1 
23.  Austria        1     1 
24.  South Africa            1  1 
25.  Spain           1  1 
26.  Taiwan        1     1 
27.  Argentina           1  1 
28.  Brazil           1  1 
29. Italy           1  1 
30.  Mexico        1     1 
31.  Norway           1  1 
32.  Russia           1  1 





Table 3: Number of universities in the Top 200 divided by country and ranking position -(Overall score) 2009 
Nation  I - 50  51-100  101-150  151-200  Tot. 
1.  Usa  18  14  13  9  54 
2.  UK  8  10  5  6  29 
3.  Japan  3  3  2  3  11 
4.  Canada  3  1  5  2  11 
5.  Netherlands  1  3  4  3  11 
6.  Germany     4  3  3  10 
7.  Australia  6  2     1  9 
8.  Switzerland  2  2  1  2  7 
9.  China  1  1  1  3  6 
10.  Hong Kong  3     1  1  5 
11.  Sweden     2     3  5 
12.  Belgium     1  2  2  5 
13.  France  2  2        4 
14.  South Korea   1  1  1  1  4 
15.  Denmark  1  1     1  3 
16.  New Zealand     1  1  1  3 
17.  Israel        3     3 
18.  Singapore  1  1        2 
19.  Ireland  1  1        2 
20.  Norway        1  1  2 
21.  India           2  2 
22.  Russia           2  2 
23.  Taiwan     1        1 
24.  Austria        1     1 
25.  Finland        1     1 
26.  South Africa         1     1 
27.  Thailand        1     1 
28.  Greece           1  1 
29. Italy           1  1 
30.  Malaysia           1  1 
31.  Mexico           1  1 






Table 4: Number of universities in the Top 200 divided by country and ranking position - (Citation/staff score) 2007 
Nation  I - 50  51-100  101-150  151-200  Tot. 
1.  Usa  33  18  4  2  57 
2.  UK     6  16  10  32 
3.  Australia     1  3  7  11 
4.  Japan  4  4     3  11 
5.  Canada  3  4  3  1  11 
6.  Netherlands  3  2  6     11 
7.  Germany     2  3  6  11 
8.  China        2  4  6 
9.  Switzerland  2     1  2  5 
10.  France  1  2  1  1  5 
11.  Belgium     1  3  1  5 
12.  Hong Kong  1  2  1     4 
13.  Sweden     2  2     4 
14.  Denmark     1  2     3 
15.  New Zealand           3  3 
16.  Israel  2           2 
17.  Austria  1        1  2 
18.  Finland  1        1  2 
19.  South Korea      2        2 
20.  Singapore     1  1     2 
21.  Brazil        1  1  2 
22. Italy        1  1  2 
23.  Ireland           2  2 
24.  Spain     1        1 
25.  Taiwan     1        1 
26.  Mexico             1  1 
27.  Norway           1  1 








Table 5: Number of universities in the Top 200 divided by country and ranking position - (Citation/staff score) 2008 
Nation  I - 50  51-100  101-150  151-200  Tot. 
1.  Usa  32  18  7  1  58 
2.  UK  4  6  10  9  29 
3.  Canada  2  3  5  2  12 
4.  Netherlands  1  4  2  4  11 
5.  Germany     1  4  6  11 
6.  Japan  2  3  3  2  10 
7.  Australia     1  6  2  9 
8.  Switzerland  4  2     1  7 
9.  China        1  5  6 
10.  Belgium     2  1  2  5 
11.  Sweden  1  2     1  4 
12.  Hong Kong     1  3     4 
13.  Israel  2  1        3 
14.  France  1  1  1   1  4 
15.  South Korea   1  1  1     3 
16.  Denmark     1  1  1  3 
17.  New Zealand        1  2  3 
18.  Singapore     1     1  2 
19.  India           2  2 
20.  Ireland           2  2 
21.  Finland     1        1 
22.  Greece     1        1 
23.  Austria        1     1 
24.  South Africa         1     1 
25.  Spain        1     1 
26.  Taiwan        1     1 
27.  Argentina           1  1 
28.  Brazil           1  1 
29. Italy           1  1 
30.  Mexico           1  1 
31.  Norway           1  1 
32.  Russia           1  1 






Table 6: Number of universities in the Top 200 divided by country and ranking position - (Citation/staff score) 2009 
Nation  I - 50  51-100  101-150  151-200  Tot. 
1.  Usa  35  13  5  1  54 
2.  UK  2  7  11  9  29 
3.  Canada  3  4  4     11 
4.  Japan  1  4  3  3  11 
5.  Netherlands  1  4  3  3  11 
6.  Germany  1  1  4  4  10 
7.  Australia     2  5  2  9 
8.  Switzerland  4  1     1  6 
9.  China        1  5  6 
10.  France  1  2  1  1  5 
11.  Sweden     2  2  1  5 
12.  Belgium     2  1  2  5 
13.  Hong Kong        4  1  5 
14.  South Korea   1  1     2  4 
15.  Israel  1  2        3 
16.  Denmark     1  1  1  3 
17.  New Zealand        1  2  3 
18.  Singapore     1     1  2 
19.  Norway        1  1  2 
20.  India           2  2 
21.  Ireland           2  2 
22.  Russia           2  2 
23.  Finland     1        1 
24.  Greece     1        1 
25.  Spain     1        1 
26.  Austria        1     1 
27.  South Africa         1     1 
28.  Taiwan        1     1 
29. Italy           1  1 
30.  Mexico           1  1 
31.  Thailand           1  1 






Table 7: Field rankings for Italy 
  Field  Papers  Citations  Citations per paper  World average  % 
+/– 
1  Physics  49,981   482,807   9.66  8.19  +18 
2   Agricultural sciences  6,918   50,323   7.27  6.20  +17 
3  Space sciences  12,093   184,680   15.27  13.17  +16 
4   Clinical medicine  101,537   1,380,522   13.60  11.99  +13 
5  Chemistry  42,863   467,368   10.90  9.72  +12 
6  Engineering  33,372   146,901   4.40  3.93  +12 
7  Materials science  10,753   66,832   6.22  5.72  +9 
8   Pharmacology  8,731   97,159   11.13  10.96  +2 
9  Mathematics  13,261   41,125   3.10  3.07  +1 
10  Psychology/psychiatry  4,681   46,353   9.90  9.93  0 
11  Computer sciences  12,087   36,854   3.05  3.15  –3 
12  Geosciences  12,615   105,123   8.33  8.72  –4 
13  Immunology  6,267   125,554   20.03  20.92  –4 
14  Social sciences  3,743   14,992   4.01  4.16  –4 
15  Plant and animal science  16,786   106,104   6.32  7.06  –10 
16  Environmental sciences  7,521   64,287   8.55  9.75  –12 
17  Molecular biology  12,162   253,373   20.83  25.13  –17 
18  Neurosciences  18,273   268,328   14.68  18.18  –19 
19  Biochemistry  24,456   319,059   13.05  16.41  –20 
20  Economics/business  3,632   14,908   4.10  5.19  –21 
21  Microbiology  5,430   62,196   11.45  15.04  –24 
Table 7 is from The Times of Higher Education Supplement, 2 April 2009. The THES used data provided by 






Table 8: Field rankings for Canada 
  Field  Papers  Citations  Citations per paper  World average  % +/– 
1  Space science  5,610  106,740  19.03  12.99  + 46 
2  Clinical medicine  86,384  1,379,868  15.97  11.66  + 37 
3  Physics  23,736  246,360  10.38  8.02  + 29 
4  Agricultural sciences  7,662  59,272  7.74  6.10  + 27 
5  Pharmacology  6,111  82,905  13.57  10.83  + 25 
6  Chemistry  31,936  369,093  11.56  9.60  + 20 
7  Plant/animal sciences  30,853  249,712  8.09  6.83  + 18 
8  Environment/ecology  17,752  198,265  11.17  9.56  + 17 
9  Materials science  10,993  71,781  6.53  5.73  + 14 
10  Geosciences  17,910  171,518  9.58  8.46  + 13 
11  Psychiatry/psychology  16,351  179,179  10.96  9.72  + 13 
12  Computer science  11,586  39,944  3.45  3.08  + 12 
13  Biology/biochemistry  25,776  452,735  17.56  15.76  + 11 
14  Engineering  32,910  143,409  4.36  3.92  + 11 
15  Mathematics  11,850  39,394  3.32  3.00  + 11 
16  Microbiology  6,241  98,593  15.80  14.46  + 9 
17  Neuroscience  18,368  351,076  19.11  17.56  + 9 
18  Molecular biology  13,967  353,030  25.28  23.90  + 6 
19  Economics/business  7,973  41,580  5.22  5.04  + 4 
20  Immunology  5,267  105,742  20.08  19.95  + 1 
Table 8  is from The Times of Higher Education Supplement, 10 September 2009. The THES used data 
provided by Thomson Reuters  from its Essential Science Indicators database, January 1999 to April 
2009,. 
 
 